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Background: A core task for commanders in charge of an emergency response operation is to make decisions. The
purposes of the study were to describe what critical decisions the ambulance commander and the medical commander
make in a mass casualty incident response and to explore what the underlying conditions affecting decision-making are.
The study was conducted in the context of the 2011 government district terrorist bombing in Norway.
Methods: The study was a retrospective, descriptive observational study collecting data through participating observation,
semi-structured interviews, and recordings of emergency medical services’ radio communications. Analysis was conducted
using systematic text condensation. The ambulance commander was interviewed using the critical decision method.
Results: The medical emergency response lasted 6.5 h, with little clinical activity after 2 h. Most critical decisions were
made within the first 30 min, with the ambulance commander making the bulk of decisions. Situation assessment and
underlying uncertainties strongly affected decision-making, but there was a mutual interaction between these three factors
that developed throughout the different stages of the operation. Knowledge and experience were major determinants of
how easily commanders picked up sensory cues and translated them into situation assessments. The number and
magnitude of uncertainties were largest in the development stage, after most of the critical decisions had been made.
Conclusions: In the studied mass casualty incident, the commanders made most critical decisions in the early stages of
the emergency response when resources did not meet demand. Decisions were made under significant uncertainty
and time pressure. Ambulance and medical commanders should be prepared to make situation assessments and
decisions early and be ready to adjust as uncertainties are reduced.
Keywords: Decision-making; Emergency medical services; Emergency medicine; Leadership; Mass casualty incidents;
Observational study; Risk managementBackground
Commanders are the individuals appointed to be in
charge of an emergency response operation. A core
task for commanders is to make decisions [1-3]. Narra-
tives and analyses of mass casualty incidents will typic-
ally not contain detailed descriptions of what decisions
the commanders made. Based on a previously pub-
lished case description of the 2011 Oslo bombing, the
aim of this study was to probe deeper into the actions* Correspondence: rune.rimstad@norskluftambulanse.no
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origof the commanders to contribute to the empirical
knowledge base on incident command and decision-
making [4]. The research questions are more focused
on the ‘what’ than the ‘how’: What critical decisions do
the ambulance commander and the medical com-
mander make in a mass casualty incident emergency
response? What are the underlying conditions affecting
decision-making?
In the Norwegian incident command system, a police
incident commander provides overall command. The
prehospital health resources are jointly commanded by
an ambulance commander (emergency medical techni-
cian or paramedic), which appoint sub-commanders
and organize the incident scene, and a medicalhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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responsibility of triage, treatment, and evacuation and
assign tasks to physicians and nurses on scene. The
commanders’ role descriptions are on a national level
outdated and under debate.
Analyses of how experienced commanders make
decisions have been made in several fields: police, fire
and rescue, high-risk industry, military, and emergency
medical services [3,5-10]. The predominant paradigm
in this research field in recent years is that of naturalis-
tic decision-making. Characteristics of real-world deci-
sion settings include uncertain dynamic environments,
time stress, high stakes, multiple players, and ill-
structured problems [11]. Experienced practitioners do
not usually develop and compare options but make
rapid decisions of what actions to initiate based on rec-
ognition of familiar situations through critical cues
[12]. Repeated situation assessment leads to later ad-
justments of the strategy.
Studies from the emergency medical services are un-
derrepresented in the decision-making literature and
even more so when it comes to prehospital com-
manders’ decisions in mass casualty incidents. A few
articles focus on triage and triage decisions [13-15].
Some present information systems that could help
commanders in specific decision situations or support
pre-event planning [16,17].
The following article presents how differences in ex-
perience and pre-event status affected how the ambu-
lance commander and the medical commander
interpreted their roles and executed their tasks. The
timeline of the emergency response operation is di-
vided in stages with differences in situation assessment
that affect decision-making. Critical decisions and the
underlying uncertainties are mapped in each stage.
The final discussion explores the interaction between
situational awareness, uncertainties, and critical deci-
sions, cf. Figure 1.Figure 1 Interactions between decisions, uncertainties, and
situation assessment. Situation assessment is the basis for decisions,
and uncertainties influence decision-making. However, decisions
affect how uncertainties are perceived and how the situation is
assessed. Uncertainties also affect the situation assessment, and the
importance of uncertainties depends on the assessment of the
situation. There is, in other words, an interdependency between
the three factors.Methods
The study is a retrospective, descriptive observational
study. Data was collected through participating observa-
tion, interviews, and recordings of radio communications.
Radio communications between the dispatch center,
commanders, and ambulance crews on scene and else-
where in the local area were routinely logged and
stored as a collection of electronic audio files. This
material contained confidential patient information.
Permission to use the material without asking for con-
sent from the involved patients was given by the
Regional Ethics Committee (#2012/1673/REK), on the
condition that personal and clinical information on sin-
gle patients were omitted at transcription. The audio
log files were then retrieved and transcribed with the
due omissions.
Permission to conduct interviews with personnel in-
volved in the incident response was given by the Ethics
Committee at Oslo University Hospital (#2012-15778).
Potential informants were identified from the radio com-
munication transcripts. The ambulance commander,
assisting ambulance commander, the four paramedics
filling sub-commander roles on the incident scene, and
two operators at the dispatch center were contacted by
e-mail and asked to participate as informants in the
study. The e-mail contained information about the aims
of the study and job-related information about the inter-
viewer. All personnel with some form of commander or
sub-commander roles were invited to participate, and
they all accepted the invitation and returned written
consent. Some of the informants were known to the re-
searchers as colleagues through several years. Others
were unknown beforehand.
An interview guide was developed on basis of
preliminary coding and analysis of the radio communi-
cation transcripts, cf. Additional file 1. Eight semi-
structured interviews were conducted between May
and June 2013 at the researcher or participant’s work-
place, with no third party present. Six interviews lasted
between 45 and 60 min, while one interview with a
paramedic that was appointed a sub-commander but
reassigned to other tasks and therefore had little direct
contact with the studied commanders during the inci-
dent only lasted 25 min. The ambulance commander
was interviewed last, using the critical decision method
with several sweeps through the incident to (1) estab-
lish and verify a timeline, (2) deepen the understanding
of decision-making processes, and (3) explore specific
themes using so-called ‘what if ’ queries [18]. This
interview lasted 90 min. Interviews were audio re-
corded and transcribed. Brief field notes were taken.
Demographic data were not collected. Each participant
was only interviewed once. Participants were not asked
to comment or correct transcripts or findings.
Table 1 Cues to situation assessment
Type of cues Cues
Visual Smoke
People escaping the incident
Casualties
Broken windows
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emergency response to the 2011 Oslo bombing, thereby
conducting participating observation and earning famil-
iarity with the specific case context before the research
project was conceived. Field notes were taken 5 days
after the incident and later expanded on basis of the
later developed interview guide.
The total data material consisted of transcripts of
radio communications, interviews, and field notes. These
texts were analyzed using systematic text condensation
as described by Malterud [19,20]. Its main structure
can be summarized as four steps: (1) get an overview,
(2) identify meaning-bearing units, (3) abstract the con-
tents of each unit, and (4) summarize the implications
[20]. Both researchers performed the first two steps in-
dependently and then the next steps together. Prelimin-
ary analysis was performed to develop the interview
guide. The total text material was then analyzed as a
whole. The coding tree (i.e., the categories used to
structure meaning-bearing units) was developed during
analysis as a central element. The final coding tree con-
sisted of three main categories: situation assessment,
decisions, and uncertainties. The research questions
were rephrased in the final stages of analysis to more
strongly highlight these categories as independent and
interdependent units.
As presented by Burke, the identified critical deci-
sions were classified as standard (taught explicitly or so
common that everyone would agree as to the alterna-
tives), typical (modifications to standard operating
knowledge to meet the requirements of the situation),
or constructed (no standard solution available; typically
involve creative problem solving) [7]. Burke’s nomen-
clature of stages in an emergency response operation
was also used [7].
The temporal extension of each described uncertainty
and the amount of uncertainty at each point in time
were evaluated by both researchers together based on
the interviews, which specifically addressed these issues,
and the amount of focus in radio transmissions. For il-
lustrative purposes, each uncertainty was coded along
the timeline as not present, small, or large.Falling debris
Fire
Damaged facades
Mobilized rescue vehicles
Olfactory Burnt explosive material
Smoke
Audio Explosion
Falling glass
Fire alarms
Commanders use visual, olfactory, and audio cues to make situation assessments
by matching previous experience and knowledge to distinct cues.Results
In the afternoon of 22 July 2011, a single perpetrator
detonated a car bomb in the government district of
Oslo, Norway. He later involved in a shooting spree at a
youth camp. The focus of this study was the ambulance
and medical commanders’ decisions and actions on the
government district scene. The emergency medical
dispatch operators make decisions regarding mobilization
and dispatch of resources, while decision-making and
management on scene is the responsibility of thecommanders. Dispatch center decisions have not been a
subject of analysis.
The overall analysis revealed situation assessment
(including situational awareness), uncertainties, and crit-
ical decisions as the major themes. Results from each
theme is presented and illustrated in more detail. Their
relationship and interdependencies are then discussed.
Situation assessment
Situation assessment is based on sensory cues like
sound, smell, and even taste, as well as what is visible.
Cues are interpreted and compared to previous experi-
ences, often on an unconscious level. This section
starts with a description of the cues available to com-
manders on this particular incident ground, cf. Table 1.
The impact of personal experience from large-scale
incidents on situation assessment is highlighted, before
illustrating how changes in situational awareness may
be expressed by dividing the incident timeline into sub-
sequent stages.
Before receiving calls to the dispatch center, nearby
ambulances reported the explosion based on the loud
sound, accompanying ground shaking from the shock
wave, and a large smoke cloud. The amount of buildings
with extensive façade damage gave an impression of the
incident as huge. A less prominent cue was the smell of
smoke from building fires.
Hundreds of people spontaneously evacuated the area
around the explosion site. They looked distressed, anx-
ious, or even aggressive, and a couple of them physically
tried to drag ambulance personnel out of their cars to
underpin how urgent help was needed.
Previous experience with actual mass casualty inci-
dents was helpful in grasping or making sense of the
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service experience from war-like situations and from re-
lief work in natural disasters. A couple of informants
had through many years paid a special interest in pre-
paring for large-scale incidents and therefore taken
courses and read up on books and articles on the sub-
ject. Those with no experience or special interest in
mass casualty incidents expressed difficulties in coming
to terms with what was going on. It is also a prominent
feature from both radio communications and interviews
that unexperienced personnel had more questions about
their own safety and were more skeptical of entering the
affected area.
An emergency response is a dynamic event, circum-
stances change over time. In a bomb explosion, most
casualties are injured immediately and the number of
casualties on scene reduced as patients is transported to
health-care facilities. The amount of available resources
builds up and is then reduced. The dynamics of the
event can be described by dividing the response in
stages. Each stage has prominent features that are
recognizable across different events.
The main activity in the mobilization/en route stage
is to dispatch and transport the first resources to the
incident ground, cf. Figure 2. ‘On arrival’ is more of a
time stamp than a stage. Direct contact with the inci-
dent will give valuable clues to confirm or rebuild the
situational awareness. The initial response stage is a
period of lack of resources and prioritization between
lifesaving and information gathering activities. Develop-
ment is a stage of better balance between needs and
available resources and will typically be the stage where
the bulk of patients receive treatment and are trans-
ported off the incident ground. The conclusion stage is
a period of normalization of organization, discharge of
resources, and little clinical activity.Figure 2 Stages in the emergency response. The emergency response i
defined as the time of critical events in the response operation. The timelin
stage started when the explosion occurred and ended when the ambulanc
ground (1525 to 1534/0 to 9 min, 9 min in total). On arrival was constituted
total). The establishment of a joint command post with police, fire, and he
to 1553/10 to 28 min, 18 min in total) and development. The developmen
casualties (1553 to 1728/28 to 123 min, 95 min in total). The conclusion sta
emergency medical service presence (1728-ca 2200/123 to 395 min, 272 mUncertainties
A major obstacle to decision-making is the uncertainties in
the factual basis for decisions. Incident commanders sel-
dom possess a clear picture of all that is going on, and it is
not clear what the consequences will be from choosing
one action over another. The magnitude and importance
of different uncertainties change over time, cf. Figure 3.
Conflicting information from numerous callers to the
dispatch center resulted in initial uncertainty about the
actual location of the detonation site. The correct loca-
tion was not clear until the ambulance and medical
commanders reached the site on foot a few minutes into
the initial response stage.
The extent of building damage over several quarters
made the boundaries of the incident ground uncertain
and somewhat time consuming to establish. Clarification
of boundaries was important to be able to distribute
resources sensibly.
A vital information to scale the mobilization of ambu-
lance resources is the number of casualties and the se-
verity of their injuries. This was uncertain from
mobilization throughout the initial response stage. In
the development stage, the number of available re-
sources rose and remarkably, few new patients were
found. This indicated that the up till then expected large
number of severely injured patients inside the buildings
had been overestimated. A clear and detailed picture of
the magnitude of casualties and injuries was not reached
until the end of the development stage.
Personnel safety was a continuing uncertainty for the
duration of the emergency response. At first, it was un-
clear what had happened and what safety issues might
be present. After establishing the event as a bomb explo-
sion, the main safety threats were considered to be
structural damage to buildings and the possibility of a
secondary explosive device.s divided in sequential stages. The transition between stages has been
e indicates the duration of each stage. The mobilization/en route
e and medical commanders parked their vehicles at the incident
of the first minute on scene (1534 to 1535/9 to 10 min, 1 min in
alth commanders defined the transition between initial response (1535
t stage ended when all affected buildings had been searched for
ge was protracted because secondary search of the buildings needed
in in total). It ended with the last ambulance leaving the scene.
Figure 3 Uncertainties. The major issues of uncertainty are listed, and their duration and magnitude are illustrated in relation to the stages in
the emergency response. The illustration represents the researchers’ interpretation of the importance of each uncertainty throughout the operation.
The informants were not asked to quantify this.
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ation site next to the building of the prime minister’s
office, combined with the lack of natural explanations to
an explosion in the area, immediately gave the com-
manders an understanding of the event as a terrorist
attack. Knowledge of the modus operandi in previous ter-
rorist attacks in London, Madrid, and New York made the
possibility of more than one attack site a continuous
uncertainty. There was no information available on the
number of attackers. After reaching the point of compen-
sation (sufficient amount of resources available on scene),
this uncertainty was reduced by a mental preparedness to
redirect staged resources to any new incidents.
The fast growing number of dispatched ambulances,
physician staffed response cars, and depot trucks made it
difficult to maintain oversight of resource distribution in
the initial response stage. Debris in the streets and the me-
diated principle of keeping out of direct site of the deton-
ation site if possible, both contributed to an initial
scattering of vehicles. The choice of different entering
points gave casualties outside the buildings treatment early,
while complicating holding track of resource allocation.Critical decisions
A number of decisions were identified from radio commu-
nications and interviews. Only those assessed to make a
significant impact on the course of the emergency responseoperation were categorized as critical decisions and ana-
lyzed further, cf. Figure 4.
Both the ambulance and medical commanders self-
dispatched based on the initial reports of an explosion
and were subsequently alarmed by the dispatch center.
The ambulance commander instructed the dispatch
center to dispatch all available ambulances and stage
them temporarily at the nearest ambulance station until
the exact location of the incident had been established.
After seeing several minor casualties in the streets, he
soon decided to send the available resources into the area
and start treating patients as they were encountered.
As a response to the widespread damages, but before
seeing actual patients, the ambulance commander
instructed the dispatch center to ask nearby hospitals to
mobilize. This is normally not his call, as the decision
lies with the hospitals themselves.
The ambulance and medical commanders arrived at
the same time on the incident ground. On suggestion by
the medical commander’s co-working paramedic, they
established staging and treatment areas and appointed
the paramedic staging and treatment officer.
The police asked emergency medical service personnel to
stay away from the immediate surroundings of the most af-
fected building to stay secure from a suspected second
explosion. The ambulance commander decided that staging
and treatment had been established on a secure spot and
confirmed that work there should continue undisrupted.
Figure 4 Critical decisions. Critical decisions made by the ambulance commander (AC) are shown above the timeline; those made by the medical
commander (MC) are shown below. The decisions are categorized as standard (common in everyday work), typical (modifications to standard
operating knowledge), or constructed (creative problem solving), as indicated by the size and color of the symbols [7]. Decisions marked by
arrows (at 9 and 78 min) are joint decisions made after discussion between the two commanders.
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staging and treatment area to give better access to the
most affected buildings.
The medical commander contacted by phone the
emergency department at the trauma center and the
nearest hospital with acute surgery functions to ex-
change updates on the situation and mobilization status
of the hospitals. Based on this, he gave instructions on
distribution of casualties between hospitals.
To reduce radio traffic, the ambulance commander
decided that ambulances leaving with patients should
use a second frequency to inform the dispatch center of
patient details.
After 78 min, the ambulance and medical commanders
decided that there were enough resources at staging.
Subsequently released units were commanded by the
dispatch center on a third radio frequency.
After a joint discussion between all commanders, deci-
sion was made to release most of the remaining
resources. During this meeting, the commanders were
notified of the ongoing shooting at Utøya Island. A con-
siderable number of the released ambulances were then
dispatched to Utøya.
Discussion
In the 2011 Oslo bombing emergency medical response
operation, the ambulance commander made critical deci-
sions regarding dispatch, distribution, and demobilizationof resources, major incident mobilization in nearby hospi-
tals, and conditions for personnel safety. The medical
commander made critical decisions regarding communi-
cation with and distribution of patients to nearby health
institutions, as well as distribution and demobilization of
resources. The ambulance commander was highly visible
as a decision maker to all personnel. The medical com-
mander had a withdrawn, monitoring role. Most critical
decisions were made within the first 30 min of the oper-
ation, cf. Figure 5.
Command role clarity
The ambulance and medical commanders express uncer-
tainty regarding their command roles and how these
were to be conducted in the best way. This was most
prominent in the early stages of the response. The basic
conditions for the two commanders’ role execution were
quite different. The ambulance commander has a 24/7
function, meaning that there is always an ambulance
commander on call. They have ambulance command as
their main duty when on call, and this is their everyday
job. They are familiar and acquainted with their peers in
the fire and police forces through numerous smaller
incidents like road traffic accidents and building fires,
and through joint training. At most of these incidents,
the medical commander role is not activated. In 2011,
there was a physician manned response car in Oslo at
daytime Monday to Friday, and two helicopter units
Figure 5 Stages, uncertainties, and critical decisions. Based on knowledge and experience, the commanders used visual, audio, and olfactory
cues to rapidly make situation assessments. The focus of attention and the overall situational awareness changed throughout the stages of operation:
mobilization/en route, on arrival, initial response, development, and conclusion. The temporal correlation of uncertainties and critical decisions is shown
in relation to the different stages of the emergency response. Major uncertainties affecting decision-making included location and boundaries of the
incident ground, number of casualties, commander roles, personnel safety, and lack of resource oversight. The number and magnitude of uncertainties
was largest in the development stage, after most of the critical decisions had been made. Details and the use of symbols for each of these factors are
presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
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physicians can function as medical commander in large-
scale incidents, but this is not often done and is clearly a
secondary role.
The interaction between the ambulance and medical
commanders was thus not based on tacit knowledge and
experience from everyday work. The ambulance com-
mander could take on his normal role in relation to the
dispatch center and the ambulance personnel on scene
but had to negotiate decisions with the medical com-
mander. An additional uncertainty was the arrival of a
second ambulance commander. He was appointed as a
deputy ambulance commander, a less familiar role as the
ambulance commanders are used to work alone.
Physicians are in general used to work in shifting
teams and to be overall responsible for the treatment of
single patients, which may ease the medical com-
mander’s close interaction with the ambulance com-
mander and other commanders or subordinates. A
major obstacle was the poor definition and familiarity of
the role itself. The medical commander was less promin-
ent or visible to the on scene personnel, and most infor-
mants had a quite blurry picture of what tasks he had
performed. Keeping in contact with emergency depart-
ments and providing decision support to the ambulance
commander are less visible tasks.Situation assessment and critical decisions
The commanders’ overall assessment was that this inci-
dent was extraordinary. The amount of critical decisions
by the ambulance commander during the first few mi-
nutes was affected by this awareness. The significantpresence of constructed decisions also highlights that
this was not an everyday emergency response.
As discussed, experience enabled personnel to use crit-
ical cues to build situational awareness based on recog-
nition. Under the naturalistic decision-making paradigm,
it can further be argued that these experienced experts
are more prone to rapidly choose a workable option
than to weigh all possible options thoroughly [12]. An
example is how staging and treatment areas were rapidly
established and subsequently moved and adjusted
throughout the emergency response, as opposed to
delaying the decision in search for the optimal location
and thereby delaying the onset of operations.Situation assessment and uncertainties
Dividing the emergency response in stages may be a
convenient analytic tool to researchers, but its main pur-
pose is to help build or frame the situation assessment
of personnel in the field. The ambulance commander ac-
tively used this by declaring, ‘We are now in the develop-
ment stage’ in radio transmissions. This signifies a
degree of oversight, established on scene organization,
and current demand-resource balance, communicated
easily through a short fraise.
On the other hand, there were throughout the first 2
h of the operation constantly new units being dis-
patched. These crews are mentally and practically in
the mobilization/en route stage and will use some time
on scene to develop the necessary familiarity with the
situation and organization to effectively reach ‘their’
development stage. The commanders on scene en-
hanced their own situational awareness by actively
Rimstad and Sollid International Journal of Emergency Medicine  (2015) 8:4 Page 8 of 10avoiding focus on resources in other stages and differ-
ent locations and ordered the dispatch center to deal
with them.
Whereas the ambulance commander was quite tied up
in radio communication and non-critical or more de-
tailed decisions, the medical commander could take on a
more withdrawn and monitoring position. This enabled
a bird’s eye view of the situation and made it easier to
assess resource balance and suggest downsizing at an
earlier stage. This difference in approach and therefore
situational awareness may be one of the advantages of
this dual command model.
Uncertainties and critical decisions
The size of the affected area and the presence of physical
obstacles (mainly buildings) on the incident ground
made visual oversight over the area and direct contact
with all personnel impossible. This functioned as an in-
centive to divide the organization into geographical and
functional units with sub-commanders, each with a
more manageable area of command. Command over
units not physically present on the incident ground was
left to the dispatch center. These decisions contributed
to protect the commanders from involvement in matters
outside the geographical area and thereby reduce com-
plexity and uncertainty.
Most of the significant uncertainties were, however,
not available for reduction by decisions. The main inter-
action between uncertainties and decisions was that the
uncertainties triggered decisions to be made without
certain knowledge of what might be the best option.
The initial uncertainty regarding the location of the
explosion and the extent of the incident was met by
sending in the first available resources to start treatment
of the known casualties, without waiting for a thorough
reconnaissance before starting rescue activities. The am-
bulance commander made this decision with know-
ledge from experience that a sufficient amount of
resources would be mobilized within a reasonably short
time, so that strict rationing of personnel was not of
the essence. A less experienced commander might have
chosen a more careful approach and held back vehicles
at staging to be sure to remain in detailed control when
sending the ambulances into action. In this case, the
experienced commander handled the added uncertainty
of scattering resources.
Uncertainties concerning personnel safety lead to the
decision to place resources where they would be pro-
tected from a secondary explosion or building collapse.
An even more cautious approach would have been to
keep resources out of the area entirely until definitive
security clearance from the police and fire departments.
The commanders mutually agreed that this was
unnecessary and rather focused on keeping the on scenetime low for both casualties and personnel, as advised by
Aylwin and colleagues [21].
The ambulance and medical commanders stayed close
together on arrival and in the initial response stage. This
made negotiations on tasks and responsibilities swifter.
At the later stages, there was less uncertainty as to who
should make decisions on what, and the commanders
split up for longer periods of time.
Perceived danger of multiple attack sites was a driver
towards staging excessive resources on scene and men-
tally preparing to expand or split the organization to
cover new incident grounds. The decision was later
made to discharge personnel and return them to their
home bases to restore the general preparedness.Limitations
A recall bias was introduced by the time lag between the
incident and the interviews. Radio communication re-
cords are not subject of the same bias, but it is not the
only way of communication in an emergency response
operation, and significant data may have been missed if
not captured in the interviews.
Systematic text condensation is inspired by Giorgi’s
phenomenological analysis and resembles grounded
theory. The analysis method is well suited for descrip-
tive studies based on information from numerous infor-
mants or sources. Preliminary analysis during data
collection, a stepwise analysis process with develop-
ment of the coding tree, and reformulation of research
questions as part of the analysis are recommended fea-
tures of the method.
A crucial methodological point is that, in this study,
one of the researchers analyzes his own decisions and
actions. This may obviously be seen as a weakness. On
the other hand, participating observation is a good
method for developing process-oriented explanations,
and it is highly recommended for the researcher to
actively use his own experiences and involvements
[22,23]. The research questions are more focused on
what decisions were made than on how they were made
or whether the decisions and the overall conduct of
command were of a good or bad quality. The study is as
such not an evaluation of performance, and the first-
hand knowledge of context and familiarity with the data
material may be seen as a strength to this descriptive
observational study.
The framework for separating the timeline in stages
used here was developed from experience by British fire
and rescue officer. There is no official standard in
Norway, nor are we aware of any international consen-
sus on definitions and naming of stages in a mass cas-
ualty incident. We found this framework intuitive,
usable, and well documented.
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A qualitative analysis based on data from a single case
is not generalizable, and findings need to be validated
and developed through further research conducting
similar analyses of critical decisions in other mass cas-
ualty incidents.
Conclusions
Making critical decisions fast on the basis of pattern
recognition and then adjust later, as situation assess-
ment requires, is superior to omitting or delaying deci-
sions in order to eliminate uncertainties in a mass
casualty incident. Uncertainties will be present when
critical decisions are made. Preparing potential ambu-
lance and medical commanders in situation assessment
and decision-making in the presence of uncertainty
may prove a valuable addition to practical training in
incident management.
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